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INTRODUCTION

A

close family member is diagnosed with late-stage
breast cancer and now only has a fifteen percent
chance of survival. She soon dies. Prior to her
diagnosis, she had routine screenings every two years, but her
previous doctor failed to detect the then existing cancer when she
would have had a fifty percent chance of survival. In New
Hampshire, from a legal standpoint, there has been no wrong. 1
This legal concept of negligent medical care that causes a
patient to have a lower percentage of survival, or a less favorable
outcome, is referred to as the “loss of opportunity” or “loss of
chance doctrine.” 2 Generally, acceptance of the loss of opportunity
doctrine has been limited to medical malpractice cases. 3 Some
courts and scholars have considered extending the loss of
opportunity doctrine to other contexts, such as to legal malpractice, 4
or to those who fail to contact emergency help, 5 but with little
success.
In restricting loss of chance exclusively to medical
malpractice in Massachusetts, the state supreme court identified four
reasons why the loss of chance doctrine is “particularly well suited”
for medical malpractice cases: (1) the high reliability of expert
evidence; (2) the expectation that the doctor will “take every
1

See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:2(III) (2010) (stating a defendant cannot
recover in a medical malpractice case for the loss of opportunity deprived by a
doctor).
2
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 (2010). While N.H. courts use the
phrase, “loss of opportunity doctrine,” most other courts and literature use the
phrase, “loss of chance doctrine.” See, e.g., Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d
819, 823 (Mass. 2008). See generally Lord v. Lovett, 770 A.2d 1103 (N.H. 2001).
Therefore, in writing this note, I use the phrase, “loss of opportunity doctrine,”
unless specifically referring to law from other states or literature.
3
Lord, 770 A.2d at 1104–05 (“The loss of opportunity doctrine, in its many forms,
is a medical malpractice form of recovery. . . .”); see, e.g., Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d
at 834–35 (explicitly limiting the loss of chance doctrine to medical malpractice
cases).
4
George S. Mahaffey Jr., Cause-In-Fact and the Plaintiff’s Burden of Proof with
Regard to Causation and Damages in Transactional Legal Malpractice Matters:
The Necessity of Demonstrating the Better Deal, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 393, 425
(2004).
5
Blinzler v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir. 1996).
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reasonable measure” to ensure a favorable outcome; (3) the nature of
a patient seeking medical care (i.e., patients have pre-existing
conditions) can make proving the causation element impossible; and
(4) the doctor is in a better position to prevent the harm of his or her
own negligence. 6 For these reasons, the court joined other courts
throughout the country in limiting the loss of chance doctrine to
medical malpractice cases. 7
The focus of this note is to suggest that New Hampshire take
a second look at the loss of opportunity doctrine. While some
drawbacks to adopting the doctrine exist, the advantages outweigh
the disadvantages. In coming to this conclusion, among other things,
this note considers the reasons offered by the N.H. Legislature in
abrogating the N.H. Supreme Court’s decision to adopt the loss of
opportunity doctrine. However, contrary to what the legislature
suggested, the doctrine does not appear to increase litigation or
insurance premium rates. Therefore, this note implores the N.H.
Legislature to re-evaluate its decision.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE
Before discussing the merits of the doctrine, it is important to
learn the context in which the doctrine was created. A look at the
early authority and literature suggest that the loss of opportunity
doctrine was created uniquely for medical malpractice. It is only in
this context that I suggest that the loss of opportunity be adopted in
N.H.
A. Case Law
The seminal case for the loss of opportunity doctrine is Hicks
v. United States. 8 In that case, the decedent complained to the
doctor of intense stomach pains and vomiting. 9 Both parties agreed
that the doctor deviated from the accepted procedure of performing a

6

Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 834–35.
Id. at 834.
8
368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
9
Id. at 628.
7
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rectal examination and inquiring into the existence of diarrhea. 10
Had the doctor followed the accepted procedure for the complaints,
the doctor could have identified the problem as an intestinal
obstruction, not gastroenteritis, and provided medical care
accordingly. 11 The Fourth Circuit found the doctor liable for the
decedent’s death, despite a pre-existing, life-threatening condition,
concluding that: “[i]f there was any substantial possibility of survival
and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable.” 12
In its reasoning, the Hicks court analogized the legal
principal above to a case involving the duty to rescue in which a ship
captain failed to attempt a rescue mission in search of a missing
seaman. 13 Just as the court found the captain liable for the seaman’s
death by destroying his opportunity for survival, the Hicks court
similarly found the doctor liable for destroying the patient’s
opportunity for survival. 14
While the Hicks court is often credited as the seminal case
for the loss of chance doctrine, Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hospital 15
is often recognized as the first case to expressly allow recovery
under the doctrine. 16 In Kallenberg, the doctor prescribed a specific
medication to reduce the patient’s blood pressure in preparation for
surgery. 17 For an unknown reason, the doctor failed to administer
the correct medication, and the patient later hemorrhaged three times
before dying. 18 In the wrongful death action arising from medical
negligence, the plaintiff recovered for the loss of chance of a more
favorable outcome (i.e., a reduction by twenty to forty percent in the
plaintiff’s chance of survival). 19

10

Id. at 630.
Id.
12
Id. at 632.
13
Id. at 632–33 (citing Gardner v. Nat’l Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir.
1962)).
14
See id. at 633 (comparing the ability to prove causation through an inaction
causing the loss of opportunity of survival).
15
357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (App. Div. 1974).
16
Margaret T. Mangan, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: A Small Price to Pay for
Human Life, 42 S.D. L. REV. 279, 287–288 (1997).
17
357 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 510–11.
11
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B. Literature
Despite the existence of the loss of opportunity concept,
many credit the widespread popularity of the doctrine to Professor
Joseph King’s 1981 law journal article: Causation, Valuation, and
Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Pre-Existing Conditions
and Future Consequences. 20 In the article, King argued that the loss
of chance of “achieving a favorable outcome or avoiding an adverse
consequence” should be a cognizable claim and that courts should
not accept the limited “all-or-nothing” approach in which recovery is
restricted to whether the defendant caused or did not cause the loss. 21
King pointed out that under the traditional approach, a plaintiff is
always denied redress when the chance of recovery from the preexisting condition is fifty percent or less (i.e., below the typical
standard of proof for causation). 22 Therefore, he argued, not
allowing recovery for loss of chance in said cases contravenes the
fundamental tort law goal of deterrence—it does not allow recovery
for negligent behavior causing “statistically demonstrable losses.” 23
However, King qualified that the loss of chance of recovery should
not be a cognizable claim unless the plaintiff actually suffers a harm
(e.g., death). 24 If the plaintiff suffers a harm, the defendant should
be liable up to the amount proportional to the lost opportunity. 25
In King’s second article, published more than fifteen years
later, King recognized the manner in which the courts had
interpreted the doctrine, and he offered suggestions for improving
the doctrine. 26 In the article, King enumerated four elements he
believed were necessary before the loss of chance doctrine should be
implicated. 27 These elements were:
20

90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981).
Id. at 1354–63.
22
Id. at 1372, 1376.
23
Id. at 1377.
24
See id. at 1362.
25
Id. at 1356.
26
Joseph H. King, Jr., “Reduction of Likelihood” Reformulation and Other
Retrofitting of the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 560
(1998) (stating some of the areas of improvement include suggested limits to the
scope of the doctrine).
27
Id. at 495.
21
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(1) the defendant tortiously failed to satisfy a duty
owed to the victim to protect or preserve the
victim’s prospects for some more favorable
outcome; (2) either (a) the duty owed to the victim
was based on a special relationship, undertaking, or
other basis sufficient to support a preexisting duty
to protect the victim’s likelihood of a more
favorable outcome, or (b) the only question was
how to reflect the presence of a preexisting
condition in calculating the damages for a
materialized injury that the defendant is proven to
have probably actively, tortiously caused; (3) the
defendant’s tortious conduct reduced the likelihood
that the victim would have otherwise achieved a
more favorable outcome; and (4) the defendant’s
tortious conduct was the reason it was not feasible
to determine precisely whether or not the more
favorable outcome would have materialized but for
the tortious conduct. 28
Both of King’s articles are almost always cited by scholars 29
and courts 30 when the loss of opportunity doctrine is at issue. The
limitations on extending the doctrine discussed in said articles—and
the limitations implied through stare decisis in restricting the
doctrine to medical malpractice—are important restraints on the
doctrine and should be considered by any state in deciding how to
apply the doctrine.
II. PRESENT DAY TREATMENT AMONG THE STATES
Although a state should not adopt a doctrine simply because
other states have adopted it, the N.H. Legislature should at least
28

Id.
See, e.g., Tory A. Weigand, Lost Chances, Felt Necessities, and the Tale of Two
Cities, 43 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 327, 350–51, 350 n.149 (2010) (citing both articles to
provide a general overview of the loss of chance doctrine).
30
See, e.g., Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105–06 (citing both articles to provide a general
overview of the various approaches to loss of chance claims).
29
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consider the significant support for the doctrine in the Northeast.
The following is a list of all the Northeastern States from the U.S.
Census Bureau: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, and New
Jersey. 31 For the purposes of this article, Delaware will also be
included in this list since several other sources consider Delaware to
be in the Northeast and because of its relative similarity in size and
population to New Hampshire. 32 I will focus on these states for the
remainder of this article.
A. Adoption v. Non-Adoption
Today, states are relatively evenly split on whether to hold
doctors liable in situations where the doctor has deprived the patient
of an opportunity for a better outcome. 33 However, the northeastern
states appear to favor the doctrine—the regional states that have
adopted the doctrine include Massachusetts, 34 New Jersey, 35
Delaware, 36 New York, 37 and Pennsylvania. 38 Connecticut claimed
to adopt the doctrine but retained the traditional requirement of at
least a fifty-one percent chance of survival prior to the alleged

31

Census Regions and Divisions of the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/maps/pdfs/reference/us_regdiv.pdf (last
visited Sept. 19, 2014).
32
See, e.g., Regions of the United States, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gmdhtml/rrhtml/regdef.html (last visited Sept. 19,
2014).
33
See Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105; Alice Férot, The Theory of Loss of Chance:
Between Reticence and Acceptance, 8 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 591, 610–11 (2013)
(generating a list of states, that includes twenty-one states in favor and twenty
states plus D.C. against adoption of the doctrine); Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 828
(characterizing the states that have adopted the doctrine as “a substantial and
growing majority”); Weigand, supra note 29, at 389–90 (criticizing the
Matsuyama court for its misleading characterization of the strength of the
majority).
34
Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 828–29.
35
Evers v. Dollinger, 471 A.2d 405, 415 (N.J. 1984).
36
United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73, 79 (Del. 1995).
37
Kallenberg, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 510–11.
38
Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978).
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negligence. 39 The only regional state, notwithstanding New
Hampshire, that has expressly refused to adopt the doctrine is
Vermont. 40 Rhode Island 41 and Maine 42 have neither adopted nor
expressly refused to adopt the doctrine.
While the Supreme Court of Vermont refused to adopt the
doctrine, it acknowledged that some reasons to adopt it were
“appealing.” 43 However, the court was concerned with departing
from its “strict” pre-established law, expanding litigation to new
plaintiffs, and impacting other areas of Vermont life and law. 44 In
support of refusing to adopt the doctrine, Vermont cited an Alaskan
case in which the District Court found the loss of chance doctrine
“particularly ill-suited in small, rural states” where the best medical
care is not available “at anything approaching a reasonable cost.” 45
New Hampshire’s treatment of the doctrine is discussed in section
‘V’ below.
B. The Three Approaches to Loss of Opportunity Claims
While the Northeastern states treat loss of opportunity claims
similarly, there has been more variation among the rest of the
country and courts have adopted one of three basic approaches: the

39

Boone v. William W. Backus Hosp., 864 A.2d 1, 18 (Conn. 2005) (“In order for
the plaintiff to prevail on his claim that the defendant's negligent acts decreased
the decedent's chance for successful treatment, the plaintiff must show (1) that the
decedent had in fact been deprived of a chance for successful treatment and (2)
that the decreased chance for successful treatment more likely than not resulted
from the defendant's negligence. Thus, in order to satisfy the elements of a lost
chance claim, the plaintiff must first prove that prior to the defendant's alleged
negligence, the decedent had a chance of survival of at least 51 percent.”)
(emphasis in original) (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted);
LaBieniec v. Baker, 526 A.2d 1341, 1345 (Conn. 1987).
40
Smith v. Parrott, 833 A.2d 843, 848–49 (Vt. 2003).
41
Malinou v. Miriam Hosp., 24 A.3d 497, 512 (R.I. 2011).
42
Phillips v. E. Maine Med. Ctr., 565 A.2d 306, 308 (Me. 1989).
43
Smith, 833 A.2d at 848.
44
Id. (discussing concern for the adoption of the doctrine because of the impact on
the cost and practice of medicine and the concern for the doctrine’s expansion to
other areas of law outside medicine in Vermont like law, architecture, and
accounting).
45
Id. (quoting Crosby v. U.S., 48 F. Supp.2d 924, 932 (D. Alaska 1999)).
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traditional approach, the relaxed standard approach, and the loss of
chance doctrine approach. 46
1. Traditional Approach
The traditional approach is still used by many courts and
focuses exclusively on causation. 47 This is the approach that the
N.H. Legislature imposed on the state. 48 This approach rejects the
loss of opportunity doctrine altogether and is referred to as the “allor-nothing rule.” 49 Under this approach, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant’s negligence destroyed the plaintiff’s opportunity for a
more favorable outcome by fifty-one percent or more. 50 If the
plaintiff satisfies this burden, the plaintiff recovers for the entirety of
the damages, regardless of the existence of any pre-existing
condition. 51 However, if the plaintiff cannot show causation by a
preponderance of the evidence, the plaintiff recovers nothing. 52
Therefore, a pre-existing condition that renders a patient with a fifty
percent or less opportunity for survival prior to the negligent act will
receive no recovery, regardless of the facts of the case and how
egregious the medical negligence. 53 That is because, “[b]y
definition, it is more probable than not that the pre-existing condition
rather than the delayed diagnosis caused the injury.” 54
The all-or-nothing approach has the potential to significantly
overcompensate or significantly undercompensate the plaintiff. 55
The defendant overcompensates the plaintiff when the plaintiff

46

King, supra note 26, at 505–509.
Id. at 499, 505.
48
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:2(III) (2010).
49
See, e.g., King, supra note 26, at 506 (referring to the approach as “the all-ornothing rule”).
50
Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105.
51
Id.
52
Id.; King, supra note 26, at 506.
53
Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105.
54
Weigand, supra note 29, at 350.
55
Mangan, supra note 16, at 302 (“It has also been argued that the all-or-nothing
approach may either benefit or adversely affect either the plaintiff or the defendant
depending upon the circumstances.”).
47
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succeeds on his or her claim because the plaintiff recovers all
damages, regardless of any pre-existing injury. 56
However, the defendant undercompensates the plaintiff when
the chance of survival is less than fifty-one percent prior to the
doctor’s negligence because the plaintiff then recovers zero damages,
no matter “how flagrant the negligence.” 57 This leaves those
plaintiffs who are “often least able to exercise independent
judgment…at the mercy” of medical professionals who have zero
liability, when those plaintiffs are “the most in need of protection
against medical malpractice.” 58
The fact that a plaintiff recovers in full if the expert evidence
demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff
had a fifty-one percent chance of survival prior to the negligence, but
recovers nothing if it determines the plaintiff had just a one percent
less chance of survival, is worrisome. 59 That is because “for every
expert witness who evaluates the lost chance at 49%, there is another
that estimates it at closer to 51%.” 60 This distinction is arbitrary and
contrary to the fundamental goals of tort law, as the outcome of the
case hinges merely on the “search for a willing witness” to testify to
the precise needed percentage. 61
However, this approach is used in many states perhaps due to
a reticence to create new law, the perceived notion that it comports
closely with traditional tort law, and the relative ease with which

56

See Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105.
See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 829–30.
58
Férot, supra note 33, at 619–20 (citing Roberson v. Counselman, 686 P.2d 149,
160 (Kan. 1984)).
59
See Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105; Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 830 (describing the loss
of chance doctrine as more fairly allocating costs and risks of injuries and more
fairly compensating the patient than the traditional method and therefore
comporting more closely to “the fundamental aims of tort law”).
60
Férot, supra note 33, at 619 (quoting Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., 688
P.2d 605, 607 (Ariz. 1984)).
61
See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 830 (stating that many courts and commenters
have noted that the all-or-nothing rule does not advance the fundamental aims of
tort law, including failure to: “fairly allocate[] the costs and risks of human
injuries[,] . . . deter medical negligence[,] . . . provide the proper incentives[,] . . .
[and] fairly compensate[] for the[] loss); Renzi v. Paredes, 890 N.E.2d 806, 812
(Mass. 2008) (stating the rule has become “inappropriate in light of the
contemporary realities of medical malpractice”); Férot, supra note 34, at 619.
57
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courts can apply the approach. 62 It is important that the N.H.
Legislature, in choosing this approach, recognizes the existence of
these issues.
2. Relaxed Standard Approach
The relaxed standard approach is the least popular of the
three approaches and again focuses on causation. 63 This approach
has not been considered in N.H. Under this approach, a plaintiff
needs to show that the defendant “negligently increased the risk of
harm or destroyed a substantial possibility of achieving a more
favorable outcome.” 64 The amount of increased chance of harm
varies by jurisdiction—some require a “substantial” increase while
others require an increase to any degree. 65 Under the traditional
conception of the relaxed standard approach, the trier of fact then
determines if the plaintiff has shown by a fifty-one percent or more
likelihood that the defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s
ultimate injury claimed. 66 However, some jurisdictions adopting this
approach have allowed juries to award damages without the plaintiff
proving causation by a preponderance of the evidence. 67
Regardless, recovery in all jurisdictions under the relaxed standard
approach, like the traditional approach, only provides full recovery
or no recovery at all. 68 King describes this approach as “the worst of
both worlds” because, like the traditional approach, it is subject to
the arbitrary all-or-nothing rule, but the approach further diverges
from just compensation by allowing the plaintiff the opportunity to
bypass a judge and convince a jury to award full compensation,
despite the existence of a pre-existing injury. 69 Courts adopting this

62

See King, supra note 26, at 506.
See id. at 506–07 (“A few courts have adopted relaxed proof variations of the
traditional rule, while usually retaining its basic all-or-nothing features.”).
64
Id. at 507.
65
Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105.
66
King, supra note 26, at 507–08.
67
Id. at 507 n.55.
68
See id. at 508 (stating the relaxed approach is subject to the all-or-nothing rule).
69
Id.
63

109

110

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 1

approach often cite to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for
authority. 70
3. Loss of Opportunity Doctrine Approach
Many courts have adopted the loss of opportunity doctrine
for medical malpractice cases. 71 It is under this approach that the
N.H. Supreme Court adopted the doctrine in 2001. 72 Here, the
injury is not the ultimate injury suffered (e.g., death), as is the case
with the above approaches. 73 Rather, under the loss of opportunity
doctrine, the injury is the loss of opportunity for a more favorable
outcome deprived by the defendant. 74 Under this approach, the
plaintiff may recover if he or she can show that the defendant’s
negligence caused the loss of opportunity by a preponderance of the
evidence. 75 However, some courts limit recovery only to when the
defendant has deprived the plaintiff of an opportunity to a
“substantial” degree. 76
Because the injury is the loss of opportunity, the plaintiff’s
recovery is limited only to the “damages actually attributable to the
defendant’s negligence.” 77 For example, if a defendant deprives a
plaintiff of a thirty percent chance of survival by misdiagnosing the
plaintiff, the plaintiff’s estate could recover up to thirty percent of

70

Tory A. Weigand, Loss of Chance in Medical Malpractice: The Need for
Caution, 87 MASS. L. REV. 3, 8 (2002); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
323 (1965) (“One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of
the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm
is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.”) (emphasis
added).
71
King, supra note 26, at 508.
72
Lord, 770 A.2d at 1106 (adopting the loss of opportunity doctrine). However, as
discussed later, the N.H. Legislature abrogated the adoption. See N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507-E:2(III) (2010).
73
Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105–06.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1106.
76
King, supra note 26, at 509.
77
Lord, 770 A.2d at 1106.
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the value of the plaintiff’s life. 78 This has been described as the
proportional damages approach for the doctrine. 79 By framing the
injury as the loss of opportunity, and by requiring the plaintiff to
show that the defendant caused the injury by a preponderance of
evidence, the doctrine appears to comport with the traditional tort
law principles of causation, while also tailoring the value of the
damages more closely to the actual harm. 80 For these reasons, it is
no surprise that the N.H. Supreme Court was drawn to the doctrine.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE LOSS OF OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE
To fully understand this third approach to a loss of
opportunity claim adopted initially adopted by N.H., it is important
to understand its elements. To recover under a typical loss of
opportunity claim, a plaintiff must prove the traditional elements of
negligence: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2)
the defendant breached his or her duty; (3) the plaintiff suffered an
injury; (4) the defendant’s breach caused the plaintiff’s injury by a
preponderance of the evidence; and (5) the plaintiff must have
Each element must be proven by a
suffered damages. 81
preponderance of the evidence. 82
A. Duty and Breach
In a typical loss of opportunity claim, the medical
professional owes a duty of care to the patient. 83 A medical care
provider has breached the duty of care when failing to act in
accordance with the reasonable professional practice accepted in its

78

See King, supra note 26, at 509 (describing a similar illustration).
See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 839 (describing the valuation process for a loss
of chance claim under the proportional damages method).
80
See Lord, 770 A.2d at 1106 (citing Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr. 805 P.2d 589,
592 (Nev. 1991)); Férot, supra note 33, at 594–95.
81
Férot, supra note 33, at 595.
82
Id. at 603.
83
See id. at 598 (discussing the breach of the duty of care owed to the patient in a
medical setting).
79
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position. 84 Common breaches of the duty of care in medical
malpractice cases include: misdiagnosis, 85 delay in diagnosis or
treatment, 86 negligent decisions, 87 and negligent execution. 88
Further, the loss of opportunity doctrine is compatible with,
and applied to cases involving, joint liability; the doctrine applies to
multiple defendants that have breached the duty of care owed to the
plaintiff. 89 For example, in Renzi, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
found the radiologist and internal medicine physician jointly and
severally liable for the plaintiff’s loss of chance of survival when
both physicians negligently failed to provide the other with patient
information that would have led to an earlier diagnosis of breast
cancer. 90 The doctrine is also compatible with cases involving
comparative negligence. 91
B. Injury

84

Francoeur v. Piper, 776 A.2d 1270, 1273 (N.H. 2001) (citing N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507-E:2 (1997)); accord Palandjian v. Foster, 842 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Mass.
2006) (stating the proper standard for a general practitioner physician is whether it
has “exercised the degree of care and skill of the average qualified practitioner,”
while the standard for a specialist physician is if it has acted in accordance with
the “care and skill of the average member of the profession” practicing the
specialty, considering advances in the field).
85
E.g., Lord, 770 A.2d at 1104 (claiming a breach of care because the defendant
negligently misdiagnosed the spinal cord injury resulting in exacerbating medical
care).
86
E.g., Bronson v. Hitchcock Clinic, 677 A.2d 665, 668 (N.H. 1996) (claiming a
breach of care because the defendant negligently failed to diagnosis and treat the
plaintiff with Hodgkins Disease for six months prior to inspection).
87
E.g., Morrill v. Tilney, 519 A.2d 293, 293–94 (N.H. 1986) (claiming a breach of
care because the defendant negligently decided to perform cosmetic surgery rather
than amputate the plaintiff’s finger).
88
E.g., Anglin v. Kleeman, 665 A.2d 747, 749 (N.H. 1995) (claiming a breach of
care because the defendant negligently left a lap sponge in the plaintiff’s knee
from reconstructive knee surgery).
89
Férot, supra note 33, at 598.
90
890 N.E.2d at 819.
91
E.g., Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 408 (N.J. 1990) (“Our holding [awarding
recovery for loss of chance] is also consistent with the principles underlying the
comparative-negligence statute. . . . .”).
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Under the loss of opportunity doctrine, the loss of
opportunity for a more favorable outcome is, itself, the injury. 92 The
injury is not the actual, unfavorable outcome. 93 However, in order to
recover under the doctrine, both the loss of opportunity and the
unfavorable outcome are necessary. 94 For example, in Renzi, had
the doctors successfully treated the breast cancer detected at a later
stage due to negligence, the plaintiff would not have a loss of chance
claim—that is, because despite the fact that the doctors’ negligence
caused the plaintiff to have a reduced likelihood of survival, the
plaintiff did not suffer an unfavorable outcome. 95 The unfavorable
outcome may include: “the death of the patient, aggravated
symptoms, or a lack of improvement of the condition of the
patient.” 96
But, to recover under the doctrine, the plaintiff must have
some chance of survival prior to the negligence. 97 The doctrine also
does not apply when the plaintiff has a one hundred percent chance
of survival prior to the negligence and the defendant has destroyed
the entire percentage. 98 This is because recovering for a reduced one
hundred percent chance of survival would be no different from the
traditional tort claim of wrongful death.
Although the statistics from which courts determine the loss
of opportunity are procured and accepted by the medical community
and are increasingly reliable, “they cannot define with absolute
certainty what would have been the outcome of the patient’s
condition in the absence of the tortious act.” 99 Rather, they are
merely careful estimates. 100 In determining the amount of loss of
opportunity, courts must speculate about the “inevitable evolution of
the medical condition” and the likely outcome had the physician
provided appropriate care. 101 Because the determination does not
92

Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105.
Férot, supra note 33, at 595.
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Id. at 596–97.
95
See generally Renzi, 890 N.E.2d at 809.
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Férot, supra note 33, at 597.
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Id. at 596.
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Id.
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Id. at 601–02.
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Id. at 600.
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account for a scenario when the medical condition takes an unusual
path, the court may require the defendant to overcompensate or
undercompensate the plaintiff, depending on how the plaintiff’s
medical condition would have progressed. 102 However, some argue
that this uncertainty is acceptable since the tortfeasor created the
uncertainty, and thus the tortfeasor should “bear the burden of
possibly overcompensating the patient.” 103 In eliciting this argument,
many courts quote King’s article. 104
C. Causation
Because the doctrine frames the injury as the loss of
opportunity, causation appears to be consistent with the traditional
principles of tort law. 105 Nonetheless, some critics of the doctrine
view the causation element to be inconsistent with traditional tort
law because the causation element focuses on whether the negligent
behavior caused the loss of opportunity, not whether it caused the
ultimate injury. 106
Therefore, to recover under the loss of opportunity doctrine,
the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance that the tortfeasor’s
negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury, with the plaintiff’s injury
being the diminished likelihood of a more favorable outcome. 107
102

Id. at 600–02.
Id. at 602; see Lord, 770 A.2d at 1108 (“[W]e fail to see the logic in denying an
injured plaintiff recovery against a physician for the lost opportunity of a better
outcome on the basis that the alleged injury is too difficult to calculate, when the
physician’s own conduct has caused the difficulty.”).
104
See, e.g., DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986) (quoting
King, supra note 21, at 1378) (“[B]ut for the defendant’s tortious conduct, it
would not have been necessary to grapple with the imponderables of chance.”)
(brackets omitted).
105
Férot, supra note 34, at 595; see e.g., Lord, 770 A.2d at 1107 (“By recognizing
loss of opportunity as a cognizable injury, we refute the notion that the plaintiff
would be unable to prove that the defendants' negligence probably caused her to
suffer injuries which would not otherwise have occurred. The right we recognize
today still requires a plaintiff to prove that the injury she suffered-the lost
opportunity for a better outcome-was caused, more probably than not, by the
defendant's negligence.”)(citations omitted).
106
See, e.g., Smith, 833 A.2d at 381 (describing the doctrine as a “significant
departure” from the traditional tort law of causation).
107
Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 832.
103
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D. Damages
Determining what metric to use to calculate the loss of
opportunity should vary depending on the nature of the case and the
availability of the medical evidence. 108 For example, in Renzi, the
court used a ten-year survival metric to calculate damages for the
loss of chance of survival for a deceased patient who had suffered
from breast cancer. 109 However, in Matsuyama, the court used a
five-year survival metric for a defendant suffering from gastric
cancer. 110
Once the metric is chosen, the court must determine how
much the defendant owes the plaintiff for the lost chance. 111 As
previously discussed, the proportional damages approach is the most
common method of valuation for the loss of chance doctrine. 112
Under this method, recovery is limited to loss of chance deprived by
the defendant. 113 Courts calculate the amount of damages the
defendant owes the plaintiff by completing the following procedure:
(1) The fact finder must first calculate the total
amount of damages allowable for the death under
the wrongful death statute…or, in the case of
medical malpractice not resulting in death, the full
amount of damages allowable for the injury. This is
the amount to which the decedent would be entitled
if the case were not a loss of chance case: the full
amount of compensation for the decedent's death or
injury.
(2) The fact finder must next calculate the patient’s
chance of survival or cure immediately preceding
(“but for”) the medical malpractice.
(3) The fact finder must then calculate the chance of
survival or cure that the patient had as a result of the
medical malpractice.
108

Id. at 838.
890 N.E.2d at 811.
110
890 N.E.2d at 838.
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(4) The fact finder must then subtract the amount
derived in step 3 from the amount derived in step 2.
(5) The fact finder must then multiply the amount
determined in step 1 by the percentage calculated in
step 4 to derive the proportional damages award for
loss of chance. 114
For example, assume in a wrongful death action the court
considered factors—such as the age, health, and earning potential of
the decedent—and valuated the total amount of damages to be
$100,000. 115 Further assume that due to the defendant’s negligence,
the decedent’s chance of survival reduced from fifty percent to ten
percent, a forty percent reduction. Because $100,000 times forty
percent is $40,000, the total recovery to the plaintiff would be
$40,000.
Many courts embracing the loss of opportunity doctrine
recognize that this method does not capture the precise cost to the
defendant and the precise compensation to the plaintiff for the exact
loss of opportunity because the figures are based on estimates. 116
However, many courts view this as the best method out of the menu
of options—the Supreme Court of Massachusetts described this
method as “the most appropriate way to quantify the value of the
loss of chance…because it is an easily applied calculation that fairly
ensures that a defendant is not assessed damages for harm he did not
cause.” 117 The court further advocated for the method while
recognizing its imprecision by discussing the long-standing
acceptance of statistical estimates in tort law, stating that
“probabilistic evidence, in the form of actuarial tables, assumptions
about present value and future interest rates, statistical measures of
future harm, and the like, is the stock-in-trade of tort valuation.”118
However, some critics have cynically described the calculation of
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Id. at 840 (emphasis in original).
See Scafidi, 574 A.2d at 407 (discussing the factors involved in the method for
calculating damages for loss of chance of survival).
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E.g., Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 840.
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damages under the doctrine as “little more than an elaborate,
arbitrary guessing game.” 119
IV. THE LOSS OF OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE IN NEW HAMPSHIRE
With a basic understanding of the doctrine, this article will
now discuss the changing treatment of the doctrine in New
Hampshire and explore the various reasons why the doctrine was
accepted and then rejected in the state. In exploring these reasons,
this article will consider the merits of the arguments given.
A. Tort Reform Legislation followed by Common Law Adoption
Interestingly, there has been some disagreement in New
Hampshire between the branches of government with respect to
whether or not the loss of opportunity doctrine should be adopted.120
First, in 1986, the state’s legislature enacted comprehensive tort
reform in an attempt to promote the availability and affordability of
liability insurance for New Hampshire citizens. 121 The legislature
believed that tort liability was expanding, which would create a
higher risk for insurers and therefore higher insurance premiums and
rates for New Hampshire natives. 122 In the statutory scheme, the
legislature defined “medical injury” as:
[A]ny adverse, untoward or undesired consequences
arising out of or sustained in the course of
professional services rendered by a medical care
provider, whether resulting from negligence, error,
or omission in the performance of such services; . . .
from failure to diagnose; . . . or otherwise arising
out of or sustained in the course of such services. 123
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Paul M. Secunda, A Public Interest Model for Applying Lost Chance Theory to
Probabilistic Injuries in Employment Discrimination Cases, 2005 WIS. L. REV.
747, 760 (2005).
120
Weigand, supra note 29, at 357.
121
Lord, 770 A.2d at 1109 (Broderick, J., concurring) (citing N.H.S. J. 190 (1986)).
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Id.
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N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:1(III) (2010).
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Interpreting the legislature’s definition of medical injury, in
2001, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire expressly adopted the
loss of opportunity doctrine in Lord v. Lovett. 124 In the case, the
plaintiff sued the defendants for negligently misdiagnosing her
spinal cord injury resulting from an automobile accident. 125 The
plaintiff argued that the misdiagnosis caused the defendants to fail to
properly immobilize her and administer steroid therapy, thereby
depriving her of a substantially better outcome of recovery as she
continued to suffer from paralysis, weakness, and sensitivity. 126
In recognizing the loss of opportunity doctrine, the court
found the injury of a loss of opportunity for a favorable outcome to
be consistent with the legislature’s definition of medical injury. 127
Therefore, the court only considered the plain meaning of the statute,
and not its legislative history in determining that the loss of chance
was a cognizable “injury” in NH. 128 However, the court suggested
that even looking at the legislative history, the loss of an opportunity
would satisfy the definition found in the statute because the history
suggested that the definition included “all conceivable lawsuits
against medical care providers.” 129 With the injury established as
the loss of opportunity, the court found that the plaintiff could prove
by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant’s negligence
caused the medical injury. 130
124

770 A.2d at 1106.
Id. at 1104.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 1106-07 (“We recognize the right based not upon an "expansive" reading
of the statute or a "generous" interpretation of medical injury, but rather, upon a
strict application of statutory construction and well-established tort principles to a
claim which we confront directly for the first time. We do not drag it from the
shadows of the common law but draw it from the light of the legislative
enactment.”) (quotations in original).
128
Id. at 1107 (stating that when the statute’s language is clear, consideration of
the meaning does not extend beyond the plain language of the statute).
129
Id.
130
Lord, 770 A.2d at 1107 (“The right we recognize today still requires a plaintiff
to prove that the injury she suffered -- the lost opportunity for a better outcome -was caused, more probably than not, by the defendant's negligence.”); see N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:2 (2013) (“In any action for medical injury, the plaintiff
shall have the burden of proving by affirmative evidence which must include
expert testimony of a competent witness or witnesses:… (c) That as a proximate
result thereof, the injured person suffered injuries which would not otherwise have
125
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In Justice Broderick’s concurring opinion, he acknowledged
that the legislation was “broad enough to encompass the loss of
chance doctrine.” 131 However, he agreed with the majority “with
reservation” because the doctrine’s adoption “ironically springs from
a statute passed in 1986 as part of comprehensive tort reform, which
was intended to preempt common law and bring predictability and
stability to the insurance market, in part, for the benefit of health
care providers.” 132 The justice spent the majority of his concurrence
explaining the history of the legislation and how its clear intent was
to keep tort liability and thus, insurance costs, down. 133 However, in
his conclusion, Justice Broderick stated that it was unclear from the
legislative history whether the legislature intended merely to codify
the then-existing common law causes of action for medical
malpractice or rather for it to truly encompass all medical
malpractice cases. 134 Therefore, Justice Broderick concurred, but he
invited the legislature to take further action if it disagreed with the
court’s interpretation. 135
B. The Legislature Abrogates the Supreme Court
Soon thereafter, in 2003, the legislature heeded the words of
Justice Broderick and expressed its disagreement with the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire’s interpretation of its statute by enacting
the following amendment: 136
The requirements of this section are not satisfied by
evidence of loss of opportunity for a substantially
better outcome. However, this paragraph shall not
bar claims based on evidence that negligent conduct
by the defendant medical provider or providers
proximately caused the ultimate harm, regardless of

occurred.”).
131
Lord, 770 A.2d at 1109 (Broderick, J., concurring).
132
Id.
133
Id. at 1109–10.
134
Id. at 1110.
135
Id.
136
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:2(III) (2010).
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the chance of survival or recovery from an
underlying condition. 137
Justice Broderick’s suspicion that the legislature did not
intend for recovery of the loss of opportunity—in light of the overall
tort reform aimed at lowering tort liability and insurance costs—
proved to be warranted given the legislature’s express statement of
purpose for the amendment:
Availability and affordability of insurance against
liability for medical injury is essential for the
protection of patients as well as assuring availability
of and access to essential medical and hospital care.
This act reaffirms the intent of the general court
legislature to contain the costs of the medical injury
reparations system and to promote availability and
affordability of insurance against liability for
medical injury by codifying the law applicable to
recovery of damages for medical injury in RSA
507-E. The decision by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire…departed from that intent by
broadening the opportunity to recover damages in
medical injury cases through recognition of the socalled “loss of opportunity” doctrine. This act is
intended to overrule that decision as well as to
restate the legislative policy that this judicial
broadening of the opportunity to recover damages
in medical injury cases is contrary to the intent of
the general court in enacting RSA 507:E. 138
Because rejection of the doctrine appeared to be motivated
by the notion that the doctrine would raise medical costs and
therefore limit medical care to NH citizens, this rationale, if true, is
quite persuasive in claiming that adoption of the doctrine could harm
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Id.
Weigand, supra note 29, at 359 (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:2(III)
(2010); S.B. 119, 158th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.H. 2009)) (brackets omitted).
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N.H. citizens. 139 Thus, to determine if the increased insurance cost
argument is a sound reason to abrogate the law of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, it logically follows that one should
consider and analyze the changes in insurance premiums between
various states that have and have not adopted the doctrine.
V. THE LOSS OF OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE AND ITS EFFECTS ON
LITIGATION AND INSURANCE COSTS
While the New Hampshire legislature and others have argued
that the loss of opportunity doctrine increases both tort litigation and
insurance costs for medical care, the evidence suggests otherwise.
Statistics in the Northeastern states demonstrate that the loss of
opportunity doctrine neither increases tort litigation nor increases
insurance premiums. Thus, critics’ fears about the doctrine appear to
be unfounded.
A. Statistics in the Northeast
Conducting an analysis of the effects of the loss of
opportunity doctrine on medical malpractice within each state
requires observation of: (1) the change in the number of medical
malpractice lawsuits filed before and after adoption of the doctrine;
and (2) the change in insurance premium rates for medical
malpractice insurance before and after adoption of the doctrine. 140
Conducting a present-day analysis of the effect of the adoption of the
loss of opportunity doctrine in Northeastern states appears to
alleviate the financial concern over the consequences of adopting the
doctrine, perhaps thereby allowing other policy concerns to drive the
consideration of whether or not to adopt the loss of opportunity
doctrine.

139

See, e.g., Mangan, supra note 16, at 287 (advocating for adoption of the loss of
chance doctrine, inter alia, because the value of human life should take
precedence over any burdens on the medical profession).
140
Steven R. Koch, Comment, Whose Loss is it Anyway? Effects of the “LostChance” Doctrine on Civil Litigation and Medical Malpractice Insurance, 88
N.C.L. REV. 595, 619 (2010).
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1. Litigation
According to statistics of Northeastern states since the 1990s,
there does not appear to be a connection between adoption of the
doctrine and increases in litigation.
The following statistics are taken from the National
Practitioner Data Bank (“NPDB”).
Congress created NPDB
primarily to improve health care quality, protect the public, and
reduce health care fraud and abuse. 141 In 2013, NPDB merged with
Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank (“HIPDA”), pursuant
to the Affordable Care Act, to create a comprehensive review of
health care information. 142 The resulting data bank retained NPDB’s
name. 143 Organizations that must report to NPDB include, medical
malpractice payers (e.g., hospitals), state licensing and certification
authorities, various state agencies, and various health care entities. 144
Noncompliance can result in civil penalties. 145 The Bank is widely
relied upon and cited by academics and professionals, including
those discussing the effects of the loss of chance doctrine on
malpractice claims and insurance rates. 146 As of the writing of this
article, NPDB data is current up to 2012. 147
The analysis is based on the number of malpractice payments
reported, rather than the number of malpractice claims actually paid,
so as to yield the most comprehensive and useful data readily

141

THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov
(last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
142
Id.
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Id.
144
Id.
145
Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Effect of Malpractice Liability on
the Delivery of Health Care, in 8 F. FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2006).
146
See, e.g., Koch, supra note 140, at 620–26 (finding that the loss of chance
doctrine has “no apparent effect on the number of claims being paid” and that
“litigation-related costs play a relatively small role” in increasing medical
malpractice insurance rates); Baicker, supra note 146, at 8–9. While the National
Practitioner Data Bank is widely relied upon, observing the Bank overtime has
revealed that it occasionally makes slight, retroactive changes to the numbers
based on new information it receives.
147
THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, http://www.npdbhipdb.hrsa.gov/resources/npdbstats/npdbStatistics.jsp (last visited Jan. 18, 2014).
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available to answer the present inquiry. 148 In gathering the data, the
medical professionals were limited to physicians (i.e., those earning
their Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) or Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine
(D.O.) degrees).

i.

Adoption in the Twenty-First Century

Massachusetts is the only Northeastern state—outside New
Hampshire’s short adoption—that adopted the loss of chance
doctrine in the twenty-first century, in 2008. 149 NPDB reported the
following medical malpractice payments in Massachusetts: in 2006
there were 258 payments; in 2007 there were 294 payments; in 2008
there were 253 payments; in 2009 there were 260 payments; in 2010
there were 232 payments; in 2011 there were 224 payments; and in
2012 there were 202 payments. 150 For easier reference, see the chart
below.
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See Koch, supra note 140, at 620 (using the number of malpractice claims paid
by malpractice insurers as an indicator of the number of actual medical
malpractice payments made in a particular state because it is the best data set
available).
149
Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 828–29.
150
THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, http://www.npdbhipdb.hrsa.gov/resources/npdbstats/npdbStatistics.jsp (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
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Changes in Medical Malpractice
Payments Surrounding MA
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While the number of payments increased by seven in the year
directly following the adoption of the doctrine in 2008, payments
increased prior to adoption of the doctrine as well. 151 Interestingly,
the largest increase in the number of payments between 2006 and
2012 was from 2006 to 2007, the year before the doctrine’s
adoption. 152 Even more interesting, payments generally tended to
decrease following adoption of the doctrine, the latest reported year
in 2012 being the lowest of all of the years, 51 less claims paid than
in the year of adoption. 153
Other states also experienced a general decline in the above
years, especially in 2012. 154 For example, every Northeastern state
except Maine and New York experienced a decline in the number of
medical malpractice claim payments in 2012: Connecticut declined
from 123 to 84, New Hampshire declined from 44 to 37, Vermont
declined from 16 to 8, Rhode Island declined from 48 to 34, New
Jersey declined from 426 to 420, Delaware declined from 21 to 20,
and Pennsylvania declined from 786 to 759. 155 Further, even though
151
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Maine and New York did not decline in 2012, both of their
malpractice claim payments declined in 2011. 156
Looking specifically at New Hampshire, although the present
National Data Bank does not offer data prior to 2002, and the
doctrine was adopted briefly in 2001, other data does not support a
rise in litigation following adoption of the doctrine; to wit, older
NPDB data shows a general decline in malpractice litigation from
2000 to 2004, notwithstanding one 12-payment increase from 2002
to 2003. 157 Given these findings, there does not appear to be a
connection between adoption of the doctrine and rising litigation. A
chart is offered below for comparison.
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payments. The most useful and accurate information is collected from the present
NPDB, post merger with HIPDB. See THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK,
http://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/resources/npdbMerge.jsp. NPDB’s present website was
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Therefore, considering the data surrounding the adoption of
the doctrine in Massachusetts and New Hampshire in the twenty-first
century, there does not appear to be a connection between adoption
of the doctrine and increased medical malpractice litigation.
ii. Adoption in the 1990s

Number of Med. Mal. Payments

Delaware was the only northeastern state to adopt the loss of
chance doctrine in the 1990s, specifically in 1995. 158 NPDB
reported the following medical malpractice payments: in 1995 there
were 41 reports; in 1996 there were 39 reports; in 1997 there were
27 reports; in 1998 there were 30 reports; in 1999 there were 24
reports; in 2000 there were 31 reports; and in 2001 there were 52
reports. 159 For easier reference, see the chart below:
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While the number of payments tended to decrease each year,
the number of payments began increasing in 2000. 160 Although one
could read the above statistics to suggest that the state did not begin
to experience the effects of adoption of the doctrine until roughly
five years later, similar patterns of increasing numbers beginning in
2000 from other states—which did not adopt the doctrine in that
year—suggests that the spike was due to other causes. 161 For
example, after decreasing in the number of reported payments from
1998 to 1999, New Jersey’s payments spiked from 480 to 617 in
2000, and then again from 617 to 950 in 2001. 162 States further
away like Arizona experienced the same decline and then increase
beginning in 2000. 163 Like above, it appears that other factors, not
adoption of the doctrine, are driving the number of malpractice suits.
Therefore, considering the data surrounding the adoption of
the doctrine in Delaware in the 1990s, there does not appear to be a
connection between adoption of the doctrine and increased medical
malpractice litigation.
iii. A Broader Look
Other Northeastern states have adopted the doctrine, but have
done so at a time before comprehensive and accurate statistics were
available to conduct the above analysis. However, Koch, in his law
review article—also using statistics from NPDB—looked at other
states in the country, like Ohio and Illinois, to determine that “no
apparent effect” existed between adoption of the doctrine and the
number of claims paid, and that other significant factors must be
responsible for the significant variations over time. 164
2.

Insurance Premiums

160
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See, e.g., Koch, supra note 140, at 622–24 (describing the economic effect of
adoption of the doctrine as “nothing more than a proverbial drop in the bucket”).
161

127

128

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 13, No. 1

According to statistics of Northeastern states since the 1990s,
there does not appear to be a connection between adoption of the
doctrine and increases in insurance premiums.
The following statistics are taken from the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”). NAIC was
created by the chief insurance regulators from each state 165 NAIC
was created to assist state insurance regulators, protect the public
interest, and to promote competitive markets. 166 Other legal
literature has relied on data from NAIC in determining if adoption of
the loss of chance doctrine causes spikes in insurance premiums. 167
i. Adoption in the Twenty-First Century
As previously discussed, Massachusetts adopted the loss of
chance doctrine in 2008 and was the only northeastern state to adopt
the doctrine in the twenty-first century, notwithstanding New
Hampshire’s brief adoption. 168 The following total premiums
written by medical malpractice insurance providers in Massachusetts
include: in 2006, $296,397,155; in 2007, $301,542,756; in 2008,
$311,579,290; in 2009, $322,553,703; in 2010, $314,627,751; in
2011, $314,106,416; and in 2012, $307,565,195. 169 For easier
reference, see the chart below.
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THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS,
http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
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Id.
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See, e.g., Koch, supra note 140, at 625.
168
Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 828–29.
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NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS,, Countrywide Summary of Medical Malpractice
Insurance, Calendar Years 2003-2012 (Nov. 17, 2014), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/research_stats_medical_malpractice.pdf.

128

2015

LOSS OF OPPORTUNITY

129

Insurance Premium Cost in Dollars
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While the written insurance premiums increased in the year
directly following the adoption of the loss of chance doctrine, the
preceding years leading to the adoption suggest it was simply
following the steady increase, with each subsequent year increasing
by roughly the same proportion. 170 However, in the second year
after adoption of the doctrine, written insurance premiums began to
consistently decline. 171
While other Northeastern states also experienced a decline in
the written medical malpractice insurance premiums beginning in
2010, several northeastern states did not decline in all three
consecutive years, like in Massachusetts. 172 For example, in New
Hampshire, although insurance premiums declined until 2011, total
premiums increased in 2012 from $38,065,299 to $39,145,975. 173
Further, in Rhode Island, total premiums increased in 2010 from
$45,764,559 to $47,082,730, declined in 2011 to $38,559,054, and
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Id.
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then increased again in 2012 to $42,721,218. 174 New York and
Vermont also did not have declining written insurance premiums for
three consecutive years like in Massachusetts. 175
Therefore, because Massachusetts had declining premiums
from 2010 through 2012, while other northeastern states did not
consistently decline, it appears that no observable causation can be
drawn between adoption of the doctrine and increased medical
malpractice insurance premiums.
Insurance premium rates in New Hampshire’s brief adoption
of the doctrine between 2001 and 2003 corroborate this finding. 176
While New Hampshire experienced some increase between these
years, the increase did not suggest it was caused by adoption of the
doctrine when compared to other states. 177 See below for
comparison to New England states.

174

NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS,, Countrywide Summary of Medical Malpractice
Insurance, Calendar Years 2003-2012 (Nov. 17, 2014), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/research_stats_medical_malpractice.pdf.
175
Id.
176
See id.
177
See id.
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Therefore, considering the data surrounding the adoption of
the doctrine in Massachusetts and New Hampshire in the twenty-first
century, there does not appear to be a connection between adoption
of the doctrine and increased insurance premiums.
ii. Adoption in the 1990s
As previously discussed, Delaware adopted the loss of
chance doctrine in 1995 and was the only state to adopt the doctrine
in the 1990s.178 The following total premiums written by medical
malpractice insurance providers in the state include: in 1993,
$21,119,146; in 1994, $19,892,132; in 1995, $22,371,992; in 1996,
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Anderson, 669 A.2d at 79.
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Insurance Premium Cost in
Dollars

$17,376,588; in 1997, $18,685,921; in 1998, $13,654,123; and in
1999, $14,223,638. 179 For easier reference, see the chart below.
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The premiums in Delaware appeared to decrease in the year
immediately following adoption of the loss of opportunity
doctrine. 180 Although, in the years preceding and following the
adoption of the doctrine, premiums both rose and fell. 181 However,
overall, in the four years following the adoption, total premiums
decreased by roughly $8,000,000. 182 While some other Northeastern
states experienced declines during this time period, only New York
and Massachusetts, states with significantly higher populations,
experienced greater declines. 183 Further, Connecticut’s medical
malpractice premiums increased by approximately $18,000,000. 184
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NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS,, Countrywide Summary of Medical Malpractice
Insurance, Calendar Years 2003-2012 (Nov. 17, 2014), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/research_stats_medical_malpractice.pdf.
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Similarly, Rhode Island’s increased by about $6,400,000 185. While
Delaware’s insurance premiums began to steadily increase in 2000,
this trend was consistent with all of the northeastern states. 186 This
trend suggests that some other factors dictate the significant
fluctuations in premiums; one law review article described the
adoption of the doctrine’s effect on insurance premiums as merely a
“proverbial drop in the bucket.” 187
Therefore, considering the data surrounding the adoption of
the doctrine in Delaware in the 1990s, there does not appear to be a
connection between adoption of the doctrine and increased insurance
premiums.
iii. A Broader Look
Other Northeastern states have adopted the doctrine, but have
done so at a time before comprehensive and accurate statistics were
available to conduct the above analysis. However, Koch in his law
review article—also using statistics from NAIC—compared
increases in premiums from Delaware and Louisiana, two states that
adopted the doctrine, with those of Nebraska and Tennessee, two
states that did not adopt the doctrine. He concluded that “factors
other than a state’s adoption or rejection of the lost-chance doctrine
seemingly dictate premium rates for medical malpractice
insurance.” 188
B. Studies
1. Litigation
Studies are consistent with the results of this note that the
adoption of the loss of opportunity doctrine does not significantly
impact the number of claims filed. A common misconception exists
that courts are now inundated with “frivolous” medical malpractice
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and tort claims in general. 189 This misconception by some that too
many are filing medical malpractice cases has been mostly
disseminated and perpetuated by those with an independent interest
in the outcome. 190 These individuals and groups have often used
unreliable information in support of reforming medical malpractice
and tort law, 191 rather than using empirically valid data, which does
not appear to mirror their arguments. 192
For example, one article argued against adopting the loss of
chance doctrine because it would supposedly increase tort litigation
and thus promote “defensive medicine,” causing doctors to
“prescribe unnecessary tests, procedures, hospitalization, or

189

Geoff Boehm, Case Study, Debunking Medical Malpractice Myths: Unraveling
the False Premises Behind “Tort Reform,” 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., &
ETHICS 357, 358–59 (2005) (describing a decline in the number of medical
malpractice cases, and tort cases in general, filed per capita in the last ten years);
Douglas A. Kysar et al., Medical Malpractice Myths and Realities: Why an
Insurance Crisis is Not a Lawsuit Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 785, 786–87
(2006) (stating the reality of malpractice suits based on the empirical data is that
their filing is “quite stable.”).
190
See Boehm, supra note 189, at 358 (stating politicians, insurance industry
executives, and medical society lobbyists are among the groups peddling
misleading information about frivolous medical malpractice claims); Kysar, supra
note 189, at 786 (“Insurance companies, managed-care organizations, doctors'
associations, and other interest groups have heavily invested in media campaigns
to convince policy-makers and the public that recent increases in malpractice
insurance premiums have been caused by a civil justice system that too easily
tolerates meritless malpractice claims.”).
191
See Boehm, supra note 189, at 358 (“In particular, the insurance industry and
other tort reform proponents rely on misinformation and largely anecdotal
evidence that the civil justice system is “out of control” and needs to be scaled
back. However, the facts reveal a different picture.”); Kysar, supra note 189, at
785–86 (“Unfortunately, the current debate over the civil justice system
[especially by those advocating for medical malpractice reform] is characterized
less by careful analysis than by unfounded claims, shrill rhetoric, and spurious
anecdote.”); William M. Sage, Medical Malpractice Insurance and the Emperor’s
Clothes, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 471 (2005) (recognizing the discrepancy
between the arguments of opinion and the arguments of empirical evidence with
respect to tort reform within medical malpractice).
192
E.g., Kysar, supra note 189, at 787–88; Boehm, supra note 189, at 362–63
(describing a study by the Office of Technology Assessment that found increased
tort liability not to noticeably cause defensive medical practice, and thus not to
noticeably increase medical costs).
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prolonged hospitalization” in an attempt to avoid liability and
thereby raising medical costs. 193
While this argument is plausible, the article failed to: (1)
provide empirical evidence that the loss of chance doctrine
meaningfully increases the number of tort claims; and (2) provide
empirical evidence that increased liability causes defensive
medicine. 194 However, in a different article that criticized many
proponents of tort reform for this very reason—for making
unsubstantiated accusations that tort litigation substantially increases
medical costs—it provided and explained an empirical study
conducted by the United States Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment that debunked the concern of defensive medicine arising
from increased tort litigation. 195 Other studies corroborate the lack
of evidence of defensive medicine impacting the cost of medical care
from rising tort litigation. 196
Overall, contrary to what some believe, tort liability has not
“exploded”; in fact, contract claims—an area of law not targeted for
reform—now outnumber tort claims. 197 This is perhaps due to
“various checks and balances” already in place to limit frivolous
193

Lisa Perrochet et al., Lost Chance Recovery and the Folly of Expanding
Medical Malpractice Liability, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 615, 625 (1992).
194
Id. (citing case studies that state the opinions of physician groups and
malpractice insurers who believe physicians have incentives to engage in defensive
medicine and offering no proof that physicians act on these incentives). There is
one study supporting the existence of increased hospital costs associated with
defensive medicine that the Bush administration appeared to rely solely on in
attempting to pass tort reform that was published in the Quarterly Journal of
Economics. Kysar, supra note 189, at 808. However, the study involved elderly
patients with two types of heart disease, and the United States Government
Accountability Office stated in a report that “there is little empirical or analytical
basis for generalizing the study’s limited findings to all patients throughout the
entire nation in the manner that the researchers and the Bush administration did.”
Id. at 808–09.
195
See Boehm, supra note 189, at 362–63 (describing a study by the Office of
Technology Assessment that concluded any defensive practice by doctors due to
liability concerns were small, and the reduction of defensive practice would yield
“very small” savings).
196
See, e.g., Baicker, supra note 145, at 21 (“[T]here is little evidence of net
increases in the use of treatments we studied in response to state-level increases in
malpractice costs, although there may be some increase in screening procedure
such as mammography.”)
197
Kysar, supra note 189, at 801.
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lawsuits, like sanctions for irresponsible lawyers and the existence
and popularity of attorney compensation via contingency fees—that
is, the plaintiff attorney has an incentive only to choose the most
meritorious cases since the attorney only recovers payment if the
case is won. 198
In fact, one law review article that looked at the very
relationship perhaps most salient to this article—whether adoption of
the loss of opportunity doctrine increased the number of medical
malpractice claims—found that no relationship existed between the
doctrine and the number of claims being paid with medical
malpractice insurance, and thus likely no relationship between the
doctrine and the number of malpractice lawsuits being filed. 199 In
comparing the fluctuations in reported medical malpractice claims
among the states both before and after adoption of the doctrine, the
article concluded that any impact was negligible. 200 Therefore, the
evidence simply does not support the belief that adoption of the
doctrine is causing dangerously high tort litigation, 201 and therefore
law should not be created under this predication. 202
2. Insurance Premiums
Studies are consistent with the results of this note that
adoption of the loss of opportunity doctrine does not significantly
impact medical malpractice insurance premiums. CDS4
Even
assuming that adoption of the loss of opportunity doctrine would
meaningfully increase the number of malpractice suits filed,
increased lawsuits and awards are not responsible for significant
fluctuations in insurance premiums, despite “being frequently

198

Boehm, supra note 189, at 359.
Koch, supra note 140, at 624
200
Id. at 622.
201
See Boehm, supra note 189, at 363. (“[F]ederal and state lawmakers, regulators,
doctors, and the general public are being told by medical and insurance lobbyists
that doctors' insurance rates are rising due to increasing claims by patients, rising
jury verdicts, and exploding tort system costs in general, despite clear evidence to
the contrary.”).
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See Kysar, supra note 189, at 786–87.
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blamed for this.” 203 One comprehensive Dartmouth study used data
on malpractice claims from the NPDB and data on malpractice
insurance premiums from the Medical Liability Monitor (“MLM”) to
determine the relationship between medical malpractice claim
payments and medical malpractice insurance premiums. 204 After
careful analysis, the authors observed “a fairly weak relationship”
between payments and premiums, indicating that other factors were
at work. 205 Although the study did not investigate other influences,
it identified other factors from other studies that have been linked to
rising insurance premiums, including: declining investment income,
a less competitive insurance market, and increasing reinsurance
rates. 206 Other studies corroborate this finding. 207
Instead of blaming increased litigation for rapid increases in
insurance premiums, insurance premiums appear to be based more
on the overall economic climate. 208 That is because insurance
providers rely on both insurance payments as well as investment
capital to offset costs. 209 Because insurance providers hold onto
revenue for many years before paying it out, the income on
investments play more of a role in dictating premiums. 210 Despite
popular belief, it is the returns on investments like bonds—rather
than receipts of premium payments—“that generate[] the bulk of
203

See Emily Chow, Health Courts: An Extreme Makeover of Medical
Malpractice with Potentially Fatal Complications, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., &
ETHICS 387, 465 (2007) (“Although malpractice litigation is frequently blamed for
the current malpractice crisis, researchers have observed that there is no clear-cut
correlation between trends in lawsuits and awards and trends in premiums or
insurance liability.”); Sage, supra note 189, at 471 (“[T]he argument that each
subsequent malpractice crisis [of surging insurance premiums] reflected surging
litigiousness requiring legal restraint is false.”); Baicker, supra note 145, at 2, 21
(finding based on a comprehensive empirical study that malpractice payments do
not appear to be “a driving force” behind rising insurance premiums and therefore
indirect and anecdotal evidence to the contrary “is quite misleading”).
204
Baicker, supra note 145, at 8-9.
205
Id. at 13.
206
Id. at 2.
207
E.g., Koch, supra note 140, at 625 (stating a “lack of apparent connection”
between adoption of the doctrine and elevated malpractice insurance premium
rates).
208
Chow, supra note 203, at 415–16.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 416.
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insurance-company profits.” 211 In fact, insurance premiums increase
most rapidly when the insurance company suffers the greatest
losses. 212 This occurs with the existence of “short-sited pricing
practices” when insurance providers set artificially low rates based
on “unduly optimistic projections” of returns or in an “attempt to
gain a larger market share,” causing it to eventually “boom-and-bust,”
which is all part of the “underwriting cycle.” 213 The false belief of
the significant role that tort litigation plays in setting insurance
premiums explains why attempts at tort reform have been largely
unsuccessful in reducing insurance premium rates. 214
Furthermore, even if the loss of opportunity doctrine,
contrary to evidence, had a substantial effect on insurance premiums,
the concern that malpractice litigation is causing the high cost of
health care in the United States is erroneous. 215 This is because
malpractice litigation costs account for less than two percent of total
countrywide health care spending. 216 Therefore, even a significant
decrease in insurance premium rates would do little to impact the
overall health care spending. 217
Perhaps even more damning to the arguments of those
opposing the loss of opportunity doctrine, for reasons relating to
insurance premiums, is the fact that overall medical malpractice
insurance premiums have actually been decreasing—not
increasing—for about a decade. 218

211

Kysar, supra note 189, at 798.
Id. at 798.
213
Id.
214
E.g., id. at 795–796 (describing the continued rise in insurance premiums
following tort reform in Texas in 1995 as unsurprising).
215
See Chow, supra note 203, at 417.
216
Id.
217
See id. (stating that even a twenty to thirty percent insurance savings would
only have a “small direct impact” on health care spending).
218
See, e.g., David Belk, It Ain’t the Lawyers: Medical Malpractice Costs Have
Been Dropping, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 1, 2013, 12:03 PM), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-belk/medical-malpracticecosts_b_4171189.html.
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VI. LIMITATIONS IN APPLICATION
This article asks the New Hampshire Legislature to
reconsider its decision in refusing to adopt the loss of opportunity
doctrine. As demonstrated above, there is more than ample literature
that supports this argument. However, in the interest of providing a
well-rounded evaluation of the doctrine, it is important to
acknowledge its limitation in application. Unfortunately, what one
imagines in theory is not always what one experiences in practice. 219
Substituting the injury of death, for example, in place for the
injury of the loss of opportunity, has its limitations. 220 Because a
death can easily be proven with a death certificate, while the loss of
opportunity must be proven by complicated statistics involving
estimates and speculation, application of the doctrine sometimes
involves manipulation by attorneys and experts, which can lead to
confusion of the jury. 221
Statistics can be manipulated by differing opinions of the
significance of data and by altering the range of years, demographic,
location, and size. 222 Therefore, an attorney, regardless of the merits
of the case, can simply “search for a willing witness” to convince the
jury of his or her position. 223 One case that relied on misleading
statistics in recognizing the loss of chance was Falcon v. Memorial
Hospital. 224 In that case, the majority relied on the statistic provided
219

Shawn M. Nichols, Jorgenson v. Vener: The South Dakota Supreme Court
Declares Loss-of-Chance Doctrine As Part of Our Common Law in Medical
Malpractice Torts, 46 S.D. L. REV. 618, 638 (2001) (recognizing that while the
doctrine has “redeemable qualities,” it is too complex for practical use).
220
See id.
221
Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hosp. Center, Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 213-14 (Md.
1990) (“The use of statistics in trials is subject to criticism as being unreliable,
misleading, easily manipulated, and confusing to a jury. When large damage
awards will be based on the statistical chance of survival before the negligent
treatment, minus the statistical chance of survival after the negligent treatment,
times the value of the lost life, we can imagine the bewildering sets of numbers
with which the jury will be confronted, as well as the difficulties juries will have
in assessing the comparative reliability of the divergent statistical evidence offered
by each side.”).
222
Michelle L. Truckor, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: Legal Recovery for
Patients on the Edge of Survival, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 349, 364 (1999).
223
Truckor, supra note 222, at 365.
224
462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990).
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by the plaintiff’s expert that 37.5% of patients who develop an
embolism survive with prompt treatment; however, in relying on this
statistic, the majority did not consider the 25% chance of survival
even without prompt treatment, decreasing the loss of chance from
37.5 to 12.5%. 225
Further, the loss of opportunity can be confusing to a jury. 226
A death is concrete. A jury can almost never mistake that this injury
has occurred. A loss of chance, however, is an “abstract” concept
and can only be understood with the presentation of “complicated
statistical data…[with the ability to] make a juror’s eyes glaze
over.” 227 Under the loss of opportunity doctrine, a juror is
challenged with the task of determining whether, more likely than
not, the medical professional caused the loss of opportunity. 228 This
involves deciding whether a percentage decreased by a
percentage 229—maintaining the separation of these percentages is an
innately confusing task for a lay jury, especially in medical
malpractice cases, which often involve complicated and technical
testimony and evidence. 230 Keeping all of the various percentages
straight is difficult “even for the most learned legal minds.” 231 In
fact, one article from the University of Texas School of Law devoted
the entire piece to reviewing “several various blunders” that judges,
lawyers, and commentators have made in attempting to apply the
loss of opportunity doctrine. 232 While there are limitations to the
application of the doctrine, it stands to reason that, as courts become
more familiar with the doctrine, application will become more
seamless and courts will receive the full benefit of the doctrine.

225

Lars Noah, An Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the Loss-of-AChance Doctrine, 24 REV. LITIG. 369, 378 (2005) (discussing Falcon, 462 N.W.2d
at 59 (Riley, C.J., dissenting)).
226
Nichols, supra note 219, at 642.
227
See id. at 642-43; Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 598 (Nev. 1991).
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Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 832.
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Nichols, supra note 219, at 642.
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Noah, supra note 225, at 370.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Although a “reflexive response” to the loss of opportunity
doctrine 233 is that it is dangerous in that it expands tort liability,
destroys the traditional conceptualization of tort law, and leads to
higher medical costs and thus lower medical care affordability—
upon closer inspection—this initial reaction is largely unfounded.
Instead of having a harmful effect, the loss of opportunity appears to
provide some protection for patients with less than a fifty-one
percent chance of survival but only allows for recovery up to the
amount the jury finds the doctor caused by a preponderance of the
evidence. 234 That is quite similar to traditional tort law. Further,
there has been almost no evidence of a willingness to expand the loss
of opportunity doctrine to other contexts, despite the adoption by
some states like New York roughly 40 years ago. 235 The doctrine
truly appears to be uniquely appropriate for medical malpractice
cases.
Last—and perhaps most importantly—while the concern of
the New Hampshire Legislature in abrogating the decision by the
New Hampshire Supreme Court seemed to be made with the best
interests of its citizens in mind, statistics do not support its concerns.
Given the research of this law review note, and those of several other
corroborating studies, other powerful factors are responsible for
spikes in insurance premiums. With premium rates lower across the
United States in years, and with roughly one half of the States
having adopted the doctrine, perhaps New Hampshire should take a
second look at adoption of the loss of opportunity doctrine. While
practice-based concerns exist, these concerns will likely abate as
courts become more familiar with the application of the doctrine.
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